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1. Introduction 
 
The information currently provided in England to measure the effectiveness of a 
school is based on the mean performance of the school as a whole, i.e. for the average child. 
We show here that schools are often differentially effective for students of differing levels of 
prior attainment. Differential effectiveness is not necessarily a positive or negative 
phenomenon. A high performing school that does even better for its high ability pupils is 
better than a low performing school that is consistently ineffective for all its pupils. However, 
if differential effectiveness is a widespread phenomenon it does suggest that from an 
accountability perspective, policy-makers need to have information that enables them to 
determine the extent to which a school is being equally effective for all its pupils. The main 
points we make are relevant to the increasing number of accountability schemes based on test 
scores that are emerging in education systems in various countries. 
The measures of school performance that have been published to date by the UK 
Department for Education are all based on the mean achievement level or gain in the school. 
For example, the modeling of „Contextualised Value-Added‟ (CVA) for the performance 
measures that are currently published, leads to a single figure for the estimated CVA of each 
school, which „indicates the value the school has added on average for its pupils, given what 
is known about the circumstances of its pupil intake‟ (DCSF 2010, our emphasis). The 
academic literature has long recognised however, that schools may be differentially effective 
(Jesson and Gray, 1991; Teddlie and Reynolds, 2000; Thomas et al. 1997; Wilson and 
Piebalga 2008). A school that benefits a high attaining pupil may not do so well for a child of 
modest or low attainment, or vice versa. Equally a school may do best for pupils in the 
middle of the distribution.  
Differential effectiveness might occur due to schools‟ strategic choices and response 
to incentives provided by „league table‟ measures of school performance. In England there 
has been an historical emphasis on a particular threshold - achieving 5 A*-C grades at age 16 
exams (General Certificates of Secondary Education or GCSEs). If schools are judged on the 
proportion of pupil achieving this threshold, they may put additional effort into improving the 
grades of students near to the threshold and less effort into students with little possibility of 
achieving it or indeed those who will achieve the threshold come what may. Differential 
effectiveness may also occur as a result of choices on student grouping. In mixed ability 
classes teachers may focus on the average student and others may get less attention. If there is 
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streaming by ability together with positive peer effects, greater progress will be made in the 
higher ability classes.
1
 If the positive impact of the peer effect is outweighed by the ability of 
teachers to better target their teaching in streamed classes (Duflo, Dupas and Kremer, 2008), 
schools that do group their students by ability may in fact be more effective for students from 
right across the prior ability distribution. Another potential cause of differential effectiveness 
may be a teacher allocation mechanism that assigns more able teachers or indeed unqualified 
teachers to particular types of student, such as the most or least able.  
Some of these potential explanations can be tested in our data. For example, we can 
assess whether schools that have higher or lower mean levels of prior attainment appear to be 
more or less differentially effective. We can observe whether schools that have more even 
pupil intakes, i.e. students from across the full prior attainment distribution, are less 
differentially effective than schools that have a more skewed intake. Unfortunately we do not 
have data on the ability grouping policy of each school or on teacher allocation mechanisms, 
and hence we cannot establish the importance of these possible causes. 
Section 2 presents the measures of pupil attainment in primary and secondary school 
that are central to the analysis together with our data, which refer to the population of 
children in state secondary schools in England. Section 3 describes how we use these 
attainment measures to measure differential effectiveness. Section 4 uses our measures to 
show the extent of differential effectiveness. We find that even the most conservative 
estimate suggests that around one quarter of schools in England are differentially effective for 
students of differing prior ability levels. This affects an even larger proportion of students 
since we find that larger schools are more likely to be differentially effective, partly because 
with larger sample sizes it is easier to detect differential effectiveness. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Measures of attainment at primary and secondary level 
 
Our measures of differential effectiveness and the government‟s estimates of average 
school performance both make use of two sets of information on pupil achievement. The first 
is the pupil‟s „Key Stage 2‟ (KS2) attainment, derived from externally marked national tests 
in mathematics and English taken at age 10/11 in the final year of primary schooling. This 
                                                 
1
 The evidence on peer effects is mixed e.g. Angrist and Lang (2004); Figlio and Page (2002); Lavy, Paserman 
and Schlosser (2008). 
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provides a measure of attainment prior to entry to secondary school which is exogenous to 
the secondary schools‟ efforts to improve learning.2  
Pupils obtain a raw fine-grade score in the KS2 tests. The scores are grouped into 5 
levels for each subject to aid understanding by parents and teachers. We collapse the 5 x 5 
combinations of mathematics and English levels into 8 groups, reflecting the pupil‟s level of 
ability in these two subjects: below level 3-3 (which we label 2-2); level 3-3; level 4-3; level 
3-4; level 4-4; level 4-5; level 5-4 and level 5-5 in mathematics and English respectively.
3
 
The „expected‟ level of achievement at KS2, i.e. the level that the government indicates 
represents adequate progress, is level 4. We use data on these KS2 levels rather than the 
underlying scores because parents are provided with information on their child‟s level in each 
subject area but are not told the raw fine-grade scores. For the same reason, we do not use the 
average point score at KS2 that features in the Department of Education‟s modeling of CVA. 
The distribution of state school secondary school pupils across prior attainment 
groups are shown in Table 1. Our data come from the integrated National Pupil Database 
(NPD)/Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC) data set for two cohorts of pupils in year 
11 (age 15/16) in 2006/7 and 2007/8. We use two cohorts to boost sample sizes for the 
different achievement groups within each school. We restrict attention to state school pupils 
for whom we have KS2 test scores (or teacher assessments
4
), which is the great majority.
5
 
This represents 1,116,982 children who are aged 16 by the end of the academic year in 
question. The dataset provides us with nationally comparable information on attainment for 
children at the end of both primary schooling and compulsory secondary schooling. 
Table 1 shows group 4-4 to contain 30 percent of the sample with another 40 percent 
in a higher group. Hence some 30 percent of children did not reach the „expected‟ level 4 in 
at least one subject.  
                                                 
2
 There are also Science tests at KS2, which were also externally marked prior to 2010. We make use only of the 
mathematics and English scores to increase the manageability of the analysis and because science is no longer a 
mandatory test at KS2. 
3
 Below level 3-3 includes not just those that achieve level 1 or 2 but also those working towards 1 but who have 
not achieved it. This below level 3 group is much more heterogeneous than the other groups. There were a very 
small minority of students with highly variable scores across subjects. To make group sizes tractable those with 
4-2 or 2-4 are allocated to 4-3 or 3-4 and 5-2 or 5-3 are allocated to 5-4 and if 2-5 or 3-5 allocated to 4-5.  
4
 Teacher assessments are used where actual test scores are missing. Teacher assessments are given in terms of 
level and have a highly correlation with actual KS2 results (Gibbons and Chevalier, 2008). In the data we use, 
the teacher assessments and the level actually achieved by the child have correlations of 0.81 for English and 
0.83 for mathematics. 
5
 See Table 1 for details of missing KS2 scores. We drop absentees, those disallowed from the KS2 test 
(generally this happens due to special educational needs limiting the child‟s ability to access the curriculum) and 
those missing due to not being in the country the previous year. Since our focus is on accountability systems we 
restrict our analysis to pupils in public funded state schools. The sample in Table 1 refers to the sample we use 
after these exclusions. 
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The second set of attainment information we use is the child‟s test scores from the 
„Key Stage 4‟ (KS4) GCSE examinations taken at age 15/16 during the last year of 
compulsory schooling. Again these examinations are externally set and marked, and the 
results are therefore nationally consistent. We use a univariate summary of achievement in 
GCSEs that combines information on the number of subjects examined and the grades 
achieved. We start with the „capped‟ average point score that takes into account the pupil‟s 8 
highest grades at GCSE or equivalent.
6
 We then add the points the student achieved in 
English and mathematics GCSE exams to the total capped score
7
. This ensures that these 
essential academic skills are included in our attainment measure, an important point given 
that schools have an incentive to maximize the points a student achieves at GCSE and may do 
this by encouraging students to take less demanding subjects rather than more rigorous 
subjects such as English or maths. If already present in the „capped 8‟ score, mathematics and 
English enter our measure twice. This augmented capped score is used by the Department of 
Education in the official CVA model.
8
  
3. Measuring school effectiveness 
 
To provide a robust estimate of the extent of differential effectiveness across schools, 
we calculate various measures of GCSE performance for pupils in each of the 8 KS2 prior 
attainment combinations. For each school we average across the values of these measures for 
its pupils in each group to obtain 8 summary statistics of pupil performance. If these group 
averages vary significantly within a school (with measures that are appropriately scaled), we 
classify that school as being differentially effective.  
Our simplest measures are shown in the first row of Table 2. For Measure 1, we take 
the individual‟s KS4 score and subtract the mean score of other individuals in the KS2 ability 
group (Table 1 shows these means).
9
 For example, for a pupil in the modal 4-4 group, we 
take her KS4 score and subtract the mean KS4 score for all other pupils in the country in the 
                                                 
6
 There are vocational qualifications that are deemed to be equivalent to GCSE and these are included in this 
attainment measure. 
7
 If a student achieves no GCSEs they are awarded a score of zero. 
8
 According to the new scoring system introduced between 2002–03 and 2003–04, 58 points were awarded for a 
grade A* at GCSE, 52 for an A, 46 for a B, 40 for a C, 34 for a D, 28 for a E, 22 for F, and 16 for a G. Marks 
are allocated for standard GCSEs, but also for all qualifications approved for use pre-16, such as entry-level 
qualifications, vocational qualifications, and AS levels taken early. 
9
 The dataset on which these simple measures are based exceeds one million students and hence standard errors 
are very small. 
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4-4 group. We therefore obtain a measure of the number of KS4 points by which someone 
differs from their group average. 
Measure 1 is a value added measure, similar to the first stage of the calculations of the 
value-added (VA) measure that the DfE
10
 published in 2002-5 prior to the development of the 
current CVA model. The Department defined 10 ordered groups on the basis of average KS2 
fine grade score across English, mathematics and science. They then calculated the difference 
between each individual‟s KS4 score and the median KS4 score of individuals in the relevant 
group (DCSF 2010a, Table A). We use the mean group score rather than the median, our 
groups are somewhat different (not being based on the univariate fine grade score average 
and not taking account of science), and our KS4 measure is the „augmented‟ capped 8 score 
rather than the simple capped 8 score. What differs sharply however, is how the figures are 
then used: the Department summarised school performance by taking the average of these 
individual-level differences across all pupils in the school. We calculate 8 separate averages 
for each school, one for each group defined by KS2 performance (below 3-3; 3-4, etc).  
Measure 1 is an „absolute‟ measure of KS4 GCSE points. It does not recognise that a 
difference of a given number of points may not mean the same thing in terms of school 
performance at different places in the KS4 distribution. It may be harder for schools to push 
pupils to gain 6 points who enter the school at the top of the KS2 distribution than at the 
bottom. One reason for this is the use of a capped score, the other is that grades are right 
censored with significant (and increasing) numbers of pupils achieving A*, the top grade, at 
GCSE. This problem can be seen in Table 1 which shows the distinct fall in the dispersion of 
KS4 scores as one moves down the table: group 5-5 has a standard deviation of scores that is 
some 40 percent lower than that in the first three groups.  
This concern leads to Measure 2: the GCSE score for each individual is transformed 
into a standardised score, i.e. a z-score. The metric is now the group standard deviation. We 
label this a „relative‟ measure. As before, we then calculate 8 group averages for Measure 2 
for each school. 
Our other measures are more sophisticated versions of these two first measures. 
Measures 3 and 4 take account of the account of the individual‟s exact level of prior KS2 
attainment. For each of the 8 groups, we regress pupils‟ KS4 scores on their average KS2 
                                                 
10
 Department of Children Schools and Families as it was then. 
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fine-grade scores (averaging across English and mathematics only). Each regression is 
estimated for all pupils in the group nationally, using the samples shown in Table 1.
11
 
 
KS4ig = ag + bg.KS2ig + uig    g = 1..8 groups  (1) 
 
For Measure 3 we take the residuals from the regression as our estimates of individual-level 
value-added – the difference between actual KS4 score and that predicted on the basis of KS2 
fine-grade score – and then average these figures for each group in each school. For Measure 
4, we standardise the individual level figures by dividing by the group standard deviation. 
(Measures 1 and 2 are the special case of bg = 0, all g, since in that case the OLS estimate of 
ag is the mean group score.) 
Factors other than prior attainment also influence pupil performance e.g. socio-
economic background. We augment the regression model in equation (1) to include some age 
11 characteristics from PLASC in addition to the KS2 test score: gender, month of birth, 
neighbourhood measure of deprivation based on home address (IDACI), whether eligible for 
Free School Meals (FSM), English as an Additional Language, whether the individual has 
special educational needs (distinguishing between statemented and non-statemented), and 
ethnicity.
12
 We again estimate the regressions separately for each of the 8 groups defined by 
KS2 attainment. The results are used in the manner described above to give us Measure 5 
(absolute) and 6 (relative). The main difference from the current DfE CVA measure is that 
the regressions are estimated separately for each group and that we use the results to estimate 
the contextualised average value added by each school for each of 8 groups separately rather 
than for the school as a whole. 
We do not envisage that in practice all 6 measures in Table 2 would be published – a 
choice between the different measures would need to be made and the analysis that follows is 
intended to inform that choice.  
4. What the proposed information reveals 
4.1 An example 
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 Full regression results are available from the authors. 
12
If they have no KS2 score we use KS2 teacher assessment instead. If their KS 2 score is missing and they have 
no KS2 teacher assessment they are excluded from the sample altogether. If their ethnicity is missing, they are 
dropped. If other characteristics are missing, they are allocated to a missing data variable. 
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To illustrate, we use an example from a particular school, school X. Table 3 shows the 
number of pupils in the school in each prior attainment group over the two year cohorts and 
the percentage this represents of the total (last two columns). Some schools, including 
supposedly comprehensive schools, only admit pupils from the upper or lower range of the 
prior attainment distribution. By showing the proportion of pupils that fall into each 
attainment category we can indicate the selective nature of the school‟s intake. School X has 
an intake that is very similar to the national distribution. 
The final row in the table gives the p-value from an F-test of the hypothesis that the 8 
means for the measure in question do not differ.
13
 Information on the statistical significance 
of any differences is needed with these proposed measures, as much as for the Department‟s 
CVA measure.
14
 Many schools with different ranks in league tables of CVA are not actually 
significantly different from one another.  
School X appears to be a „good‟ school. In general, pupils‟ mean GCSE scores are 
above the national mean. In the large modal group, group 4-4, the pupils score 21 points 
above the national mean on average (Measure 1) or nearly a quarter of a standard deviation 
(Measure 2), differences that are well determined. There is a strong suggestion that school X 
is differentially effective. On Measures 1-4, the data comfortably reject at the 5 percent level 
the hypothesis of equal means across the 8 prior attainment groups. School X seems to be less 
effective for its highest ability group of 5-5 pupils. On average these pupils score below the 
national group mean by nearly 12 points (Measure 1) or nearly 0.2 of a standard deviation 
(Measure 2). However, using measures of performance that in addition take account of pupil 
characteristics other than prior attainment, the differences across the groups are less clear cut 
and we only just reject the null at the 5 percent level (Measure 5) or at the 10 percent level 
(Measure 6). 
4.2. National analysis of the proposed information  
 
To what extent is the differential effectiveness of school X evident in other schools? 
Table 4 shows the proportion of schools that are found to be differentially effective according 
                                                 
13
 We assume that each group of pupils represents a simple random sample from a super population of possible 
pupils. In the case of Measures 3-6, we ignore sampling error in the parameter estimates obtained from the 
national level regressions that enter the calculations; Sampling error is small given the large sample sizes and 
the simplicity of the models. 
14
 The school performance tables (http://www.education.gov.uk/performancetables/) published by the 
Department do currently include upper and lower limits of a confidence interval for the whole-school mean 
CVA, although these are generally disregarded when these data are reproduced elsewhere in the media (see 
Leckie and Goldstein‟s contribution to this special issue). 
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to our various measures and using a 5 percent significance level for the test of difference in 
group means. Between 25 and 40 percent of schools are differentially effective, depending on 
the measure used. The figure is highest with the simple absolute measure of value added 
(Measure 1) and lowest figure for the relative measure which takes account of fine-grade KS2 
prior attainment score and pupil characteristics (Measure 6). The other measures are fairly 
consistent suggesting around one third of schools are differentially effective, though this 
represents a higher proportion (nearly 50%) of pupils since larger schools are more likely to 
be differentially effective (see Table 5). 
To start to explain why schools are differentially effective, we need to know the 
characteristics of the schools concerned. In the Introduction, we proposed a number of 
potential explanations, several of which were related to the prior attainment of pupils 
admitted to the school. Figure 1 explores the relationship between this prior attainment, 
measured by the average KS2 test scores of a school‟s pupils, and the likelihood of the school 
being differentially effective. As in Table 4, differential effectiveness is defined as the mean 
values of pupil performance at 16 differing significantly across prior attainment groups (at 
the 5 percent level). For ease of exposition we focus on one measure of performance, namely 
the conservative Measure 6 which takes account of both fine-grade KS2 score and pupil 
characteristics using standardized scores. (Similar patterns emerge regardless of the measure 
used.) 
Figure 1 suggests a positive but non linear relationship between average KS2 intake 
and the likelihood of a school being differentially effective. Very high average KS2 intake – 
schools in the top decile of the KS2 distribution – does appear to be associated with a greater 
incidence of differential effectiveness. We then consider the relationship between differential 
effectiveness and secondary school achievement as measured by mean GCSE scores – see 
Figure 2. It may be that some schools maximise their mean GCSE score by focusing on 
certain groups of students (e.g. those near the 5A*-C GCSE threshold) at the expense of 
others. We do find that the likelihood of a school being differentially effective rises with 
mean GCSE scores, which when considered alongside Figure 1, suggests a positive 
relationship between the value added by a secondary school and the likelihood of being 
differentially effective. This may be down to strategies pursued by schools in their attempt to 
maximise GCSE scores that have the effect of adding more value for some students than 
others.  
We look at this directly in Figure 3 by examining the relationship between the average 
value added of the school, as measured by its CVA score, and the likelihood of the school 
12 
 
 
 
being differentially effective. We might expect that good schools that on average add more 
value are more consistent (less differential effectiveness) as such schools serve their pupils 
equally. However, Figures 1 and 2 suggest that an alternative hypothesis might be that 
schools that are more effective in CVA terms may be less consistent (more differential 
effectiveness) because they are strategic in the choices they make to maximise average CVA. 
Figure 3 shows that schools with high CVA are more likely to be differentially effective. This 
does not prove that differential effectiveness is caused by schools pursuing strategies to 
maximised CVA but it is suggestive. 
We investigate these patterns in a multivariate (probit) model, where the dependent 
variable takes a value of 1 if the school is differentially effective and zero otherwise where 
differential effectiveness is defined as in Figures 1-3. Table 5 shows marginal effects. In 
column 1 we control for the average KS2 intake of the school, to determine whether schools 
with more able intakes are more likely to be differentially effective, and the standard 
deviation of the school‟s KS2 intake scores, to test the hypothesis that schools with a wider 
range of student abilities may struggle to add equal value and hence that the likelihood of 
being differentially effective may be greater where intake is more variable. Moving across to 
column 2 we include controls for school size and the number of KS2 prior attainment groups 
that are represented in the school. This latter measure allows for the fact that a school may be 
less likely to be differentially effective if there are only a few different prior attainment 
groups in the school: this too measures variability in the KS2 intake. In column 3 we include 
variables describing the school, including the gender balance and ethnic profile. In column 4 
we include the mean GCSE score of the school. This enables us to test whether for a given 
level of KS2 score, higher GCSE achieving schools are more differentially effective. 
Schools with very high mean KS2 scores are significantly more likely to be 
differentially effective. For example, schools with KS2 intakes in the top decile of the 
distribution are 15 percentage points more likely to be differentially effective than those in 
the bottom decile (significant at the 10% level). This confirms that the results in Figure 1 
hold after controlling for the variability of KS2 intake, which is insignificant in the model. 
When we control for school size and prior attainment groups in column 2 and other 
covariates in column 3, we no longer find any significant relationship between KS2 intake 
and the likelihood of a school being differentially effective. In column 4 we control for GCSE 
score. For a given level of GCSE performance, schools with higher KS2 intakes are less 
likely to be differentially effective. Put another way, holding KS2 constant, those schools 
with higher GCSE achievement level are more likely to be differentially effective (significant 
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at the 1% level). This indicates that schools that add more value between KS2 and GCSE are 
more likely to be differentially effective as hypothesized. 
Larger schools are more likely to be differentially effective, partially reflecting the 
fact that larger sample sizes will enable us to reject the null hypothesis of no statistical 
difference between groups more readily. Other observable school characteristics, such as the 
percentage of children from any particular ethnic group, are not always correlated with the 
likelihood of the school being differentially effective. The variable measuring the number of 
prior attainment groups represented in the school remains statistically insignificant in all the 
models. 
We confirm from this analysis that schools that add more value, i.e. have higher 
GCSE scores conditional on KS2 scores, are more likely to be differentially effective. We 
cannot determine whether schools achieve higher value added by exhibiting strategic 
behavior which leads to the school being differentially effective: the direction of causality is 
not clear. 
 
4.3. Robustness Checks  
 
We undertook several sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of our findings. 
Cell size is an issue for some schools, with very small numbers of pupils in some prior 
attainment groups. We re-estimated our analyses with a minimum requirement of 10 pupils in 
each cell. The results did not vary substantially to those presented here. Table 1 highlighted 
lower variation in GCSE outcomes in the highest prior attainment group (group 5-5). As 
discussed earlier, we anticipate some right censoring here which could affect schools that 
predominantly take their students from this group. We recalculated our estimates excluding 
164 selective (grammar) schools.
15
 As Table 6 shows, this did not change our key findings 
substantially. When we exclude selective schools, 30-40 percent of schools appear to be 
differentially effective, depending on the measure used. 
We would expect our results to be sensitive to the level of statistical significance we 
use when testing differences in means across prior attainment groups. Continuing to exclude 
selective schools, we checked whether using a 1 percent rather than a 5 percent level of 
significance makes a difference to our substantive findings. Table 6 shows the proportion of 
schools that are differentially effective is reduced when we use the more stringent criterion. 
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 The great majority of state secondary schools in England do not explicitly select their intake using a criterion 
of ability. 
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Nevertheless, between 1 in 6 and 1 in 4 schools, depending on the measure used, are still 
estimated to be differentially effective.  
A final validation is to assess the extent to which our various alternative measures of 
school effectiveness provide different estimates of a particular school‟s effectiveness. We 
ranked schools according to their effectiveness on the measures described in Table 2. We 
then calculated the correlation in the rank of schools across these different measures. For 
reasons of space we only present the results which use absolute measures (Measures 1, 3, 5), 
although the results are similar when we include the relative measures. Table 7 shows there is 
a high correlation between a school‟s rank across different prior attainment groups when 
using the M1 measure (the deviation of each pupil from the mean for their prior attainment 
group), the M3 measure (which controls for fine-grade KS2 point score) and indeed the M5 
measure (which controls for both fine-grade KS2 point score and pupil characteristics). The 
rank correlation of schools across the various measures is always in excess of 0.85. Hence 
whilst controlling for pupil characteristics and their fine-grade KS2 score does make a 
difference to the ranking achieved by a school, the correlation between all measures of 
effectiveness is very high. 
Lastly we note that our analysis abstracts from some important issues. First, children 
sort into different types of schools and hence, as is the case with all models of this type, 
including the Department for Education‟s CVA model, we ignore the fact that some of the 
apparent effectiveness of a particular school may be actually attributable to unobserved 
characteristics of the pupils who choose to enrol in that school. Second, we ignore any 
mobility of students and attribute the student‟s gain in achievement to the school that they are 
in when they take their GCSEs. Again we know from other evidence that this is an important 
issue (e.g. Goldstein et al. 2007) but we do not attempt to deal with it here. 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
A crucially important question is whether the differential school effectiveness that we 
observe is of policy importance. One, albeit crude, way of assessing this is to determine the 
extent to which schools would be ranked differently in school league tables if rankings took 
account of differential effectiveness. To consider this we ranked schools for each prior 
attainment group, according to our simplest school effectiveness measure (M1). We then 
correlated these rankings across prior attainment groups (results are similar when we use 
other measures from Table 2). Table 8 shows that the correlation between a school‟s league 
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table rank across the different prior attainment groups is not high. A school that is ranked 
high for low attaining children is not necessarily ranked as high for higher attaining children. 
For example, the correlation between the rank for the lowest group (below level 3) and the 
highest group (5-5) is just 0.37. The bottom row of Table 8 also shows the correlation 
between the average rank of the school (across all groups) and its ranking for each prior 
attainment group. Schools ranked high on average also tend to be higher ranked for each prior 
attainment group. Unsurprisingly, there is a strong correlation between the average measure 
and the rank for the modal prior attainment group (4-4) but for lower or higher groups the 
correlation is lower (e.g. 0.7 for group 2-2).
16
  
Hence we find evidence of differential effectiveness that would matter in practice, in 
terms of parents choosing schools or policy-makers assessing the effectiveness of schools for 
different types of pupils. We have also found that schools that add more value between KS2 
and GCSE are more likely to be differentially effective. We would like to know about the 
nature of this differential effectiveness, i.e. do differentially effective schools systematically 
add more value at the bottom or top of the prior attainment distribution. Figure 4 shows the 
mean value added for each prior attainment group for schools we have identified as 
differentially effective and for schools that are not differentially effective  using the 
conservative Measure 6 (and a 5 percent significance level). Some schools are differentially 
effective because they add more value at the bottom of the prior attainment distribution whilst 
others are differentially effective because they add more value at the top. On average, across 
all differentially effective schools, we find they are generally more effective than non 
differentially effective schools, in that they add at or above the average for all prior 
attainment groups. Further, on average, differentially effective schools tend to add marginally 
more value for lower attainment groups. Differential effectiveness is not necessarily a 
negative indicator, as noted in the Introduction. Indeed, if the majority of schools are not that 
effective for low ability students while the others are effective for all students regardless of 
ability, these latter schools could be the ones that appear differentially effective: mean group 
performance is not an objective benchmark of the progress children should make – it is just 
the average for the group. 
If schools‟ performance were presented by prior attainment group, theywould have an 
incentive to focus on the performance of all pupils. The government has already recognised 
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 In the Appendix, we consider how this conclusion is affected by sampling variation, recognizing that schools 
are being ranked on mean values that are calculated for what are quite often relatively modest cell sizes. We 
conclude that our results in Table 8 are not just driven by „noise‟ resulting from small sample sizes. 
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the impact of the school accountability system in creating incentives that drive schools‟ 
behaviour. For example, it has abolished the so called „equivalencies rule‟, whereby non-
GCSE qualifications were equated with GCSEs even though many were arguably not as 
challenging, because it encouraged schools to get pupils to take less challenging 
qualifications (Wolf, 2011). The government is introducing more „rigorous‟ measures of 
achievement, such as the percentage of pupils achieving a more academic set of GCSEs 
known as the „English Baccalaureate‟17. These changes will affect schools with different 
levels of pupil prior attainment differently. Schools with advantaged intakes are likely to be 
doing English Baccalaureate GCSE subjects anyway. Schools in less advantaged areas are 
likely to have been doing a far higher proportion of „equivalent‟ vocational qualifications. 
Whilst this change is bedding in it will therefore be important to consider how schools are 
responding and to ensure that the performance of all prior attainment groups is monitored and 
that groups are not neglected in the rush to focus on those who can achieve the English 
Baccalaureate. Looking at school performance by prior attainment group is one way of doing 
this.  
 
 
                                                 
17
 A*-C GCSE grades for maths, English, two sciences, history or geography, and a language.  
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Table 1: KS2 prior attainment groups and KS4 results for year 11 children in state 
secondary schools in 2006/7 and 2007/8 
 
KS2 group Frequency % 
% 
 (cumul.) 
% 
missing 
KS2 
KS4 
 mean 
KS4 
 std. dev. 
22 73,922 6.6 6.6 6.1 208.1 106.5 
33 102,591 9.2 15.8 3.7 274.4 105.3 
34 73,063 6.5 22.3 2.4 313.3 106.2 
43 96,762 8.7 31.0 1.3 332.2 96.5 
44 339,519 30.4 61.4 1.3 383.4 88.9 
45 119,474 10.7 72.1 0.8 433.0 79.2 
54 113,325 10.1 82.2 0.6 437.7 75.4 
55 198,326 17.8 100.0 0.5 491.4 65.1 
Total 1,116,982 100.0     
 
Note: the sample includes pupils for whom no KS2 score is present if there is a teacher 
assessment of their KS2 score available. The sample excludes private school children. See 
main text for further details. 
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Table 2: Alternative measures of school effectiveness 
 
 Absolute 
(metric: KS4 points) 
Relative  
(metric: group KS4 SDs) 
 
Raw VA score 
1. 
diffKS4 = KS4-KS4mean 
 
2. 
ZKS4 = [KS4-KS4mean]/KS4SD 
 
 
 
Regression adjusted VA 
score 
3. 
residual of regression of KS4 
on KS2 
 
 
 
4. 
residual of regression of ZKS4 
on ZKS2, where latter defined 
analogously [equivalent to 
Measure 3 divided by KS4SD] 
 
 
 
Context adjusted VA score 
5.  
as for measure 3 but with 
controls in regression 
 
 
6. 
as for measure 4 but with 
controls in regression 
 
 
 
Table 3: Effectiveness by prior attainment group for School X: means (standard errors in brackets) 
 
 
Absolute Measures Relative Measures 
  
 1. 3. 5. 2. 4. 6.   
Groups 
Raw VA 
score 
Regression 
adjusted VA 
score 
Context 
Adjusted 
VA 
Raw VA 
score 
Regression 
adjusted VA 
score 
Context 
Adjusted VA 
 No. 
Obs. % total 
Group 22 34.0 28.5 35.2 0.319 0.267 0.330 46 6.9 
                    [12.3] [12.4] [12.0] [ 0.115] [ 0.116] [ 0.112]   
Group 33 19.5 20.1 14.8 0.185 0.191 0.140 62 9.3 
                    [12.7] [12.6] [11.9] [ 0.121] [ 0.120] [ 0.113]   
Group 34 28.4 27.6 20.9 0.268 0.260 0.196 34 5.1 
                    [14.6] [14.4] [13.3] [ 0.137] [ 0.135] [ 0.125]   
Group 43 33.0 31.4 25.3 0.342 0.325 0.263 48 7.2 
                    [13.0] [12.0] [11.7] [ 0.134] [ 0.124] [ 0.121]   
Group 44 21.4 21.1 17.5 0.241 0.238 0.197 225 33.8 
                    [ 4.6] [ 4.4] [ 4.3] [ 0.052] [ 0.050] [ 0.048]   
Group 45 14.0 14.2 10.6 0.177 0.179 0.133 75 11.3 
                    [ 9.1] [ 8.5] [ 8.2] [ 0.114] [ 0.108] [ 0.104]   
Group 54 15.4 13.9 12.2 0.204 0.185 0.161 78 11.7 
                    [ 7.1] [ 6.5] [ 6.8] [ 0.094] [ 0.086] [ 0.090]   
Group 55 -11.6 -7.8 -5.8 -0.178 -0.120 -0.090 98 14.7 
                    [ 5.8] [ 5.2] [ 4.9] [ 0.089] [ 0.080] [ 0.075]   
 p-value  0.005 0.020 0.039 0.003 0.018 0.061   
 
Note: Sample size 666. School X is an actual school from the NPD/PLASC database. The p-value in final row is from an F-test of the 
hypothesis that the 8 group means are the same. 
Table 4: Percentage of all schools that are differentially effective by type of measure 
 
 
 Absolute measures 
% 
Relative measures 
% 
Raw VA score 40.0 35.2 
Regression adjusted VA score 37.9 31.7 
Context adjusted VA score 31.7 25.0 
 
 
Note: the number of schools is 3,096. The table shows the percentage of all schools that are 
differentially effective on each measure as indicated by a F-test of the differences in means 
across the 8 ability groups within a school (5 percent level of significance). 
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Table 5: Probit model of probability of a school being differentially effective, Measure 
6 (5% significance level) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 
KS2 score 2
nd
 decile 0.021 -0.007 0.000 -0.050 
 
(0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.036) 
KS2 score 3
rd
 decile 0.047 -0.005 -0.001 -0.073** 
 
(0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.036) 
KS2 score 4
th
 decile 0.043 -0.020 -0.010 -0.102* 
 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.042) (0.035) 
KS2 score 5
th
 decile 0.071+ -0.001 0.006 -0.107* 
 
(0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.037) 
KS2 score 6
th
 decile 0.035 -0.042 -0.037 -0.154* 
 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.033) 
KS2 score 7
th
 decile 0.067 -0.020 -0.014 -0.153* 
 
(0.044) (0.046) (0.047) (0.035) 
KS2 score 8
th
 decile 0.043 -0.050 -0.042 -0.185* 
 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.032) 
KS2 score 9
th
 decile 0.042 -0.051 -0.042 -0.196* 
 
(0.052) (0.050) (0.051) (0.032) 
KS2 score 10
th
 decile (highest) 0.147+ 0.023 0.034 -0.193* 
 
(0.078) (0.072) (0.074) (0.042) 
Standard deviation of KS2 score 0.000 -0.020 -0.018 -0.003 
 
(0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Number of pupils 
 
0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of pupils squared 
 
0.000+ 0.000 0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of prior attainment groups 
 
-0.011 -0.011 0.004 
  
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Male 
  
0.057 0.094** 
   
(0.042) (0.042) 
White Other 
  
-0.312 -0.340 
   
(0.212) -(0.218) 
Black African 
  
-0.198 -0.254 
   
(0.295) -(0.292) 
Black Caribbean 
  
0.269 0.157 
   
(0.307) (0.315) 
Black Other 
  
-0.419 -0.194 
   
(0.814) (0.815) 
Indian 
  
-0.082 -0.205 
   
(0.146) (0.147) 
Pakistani 
  
0.176 0.077 
   
(0.101)+ (0.102) 
Bangladeshi 
  
-0.469 -0.567** 
   
(0.255)+ (0.257) 
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Chinese 
  
1.507 0.763 
   
(1.412) (1.420) 
Asian Other 
  
-1.096 -1.302** 
   
(0.650)+ (0.643) 
Mixed 
  
0.040 0.210 
   
(0.389) (0.393) 
Other 
  
-0.377 -0.457 
   
(0.460) (0.433) 
Unknown 
  
-0.024 -0.229 
   
(1.014) (1.014) 
GCSE points score (mean) 
   
0.002* 
    
(0.000) 
Observations 3096 3096 3096 3096 
 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; * 
significant at 1% level. The dummies for KS2 scores indicate deciles of the distribution of 
schools by their pupils‟ average KS2 marks (averaged of maths and English). The base case 
is a school in the bottom decile of the distribution. For ethnicity, the base case is White 
British. The marginal effects are calculated at the means of all variables. A school is 
differentially effective if its group means for Measure 6 are significantly different at the 5% 
level. 
 
 
Table 6: Percentage of schools that are differentially effective by type of measure 
(absolute measures only) at different levels of statistical significance (selective schools 
excluded) 
 
 
   % differentially effective 
 5% sig. level 1% sig. level 
Raw VA score (M1) 
37.0 23.4 
Regression adjusted VA score (M3) 
35.2 21.6 
Context Adjusted VA score (M5) 
29.8 17.0 
 
 
Note. The figures relate to 2,932 schools that are not (explicitly) selective in their intakes. 
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Table 7: Rank correlations of schools by group across different measures of school 
effectiveness (absolute Measures 1, 3 and 5) 
  
 
 M1 and M3 M1 and M5 M3 and M5 
Group 22 0.99 0.92 0.93 
Group 33 0.99 0.91 0.92 
Group 34 0.99 0.88 0.89 
Group 43 0.99 0.91 0.92 
Group 44 0.99 0.87 0.89 
Group 45 0.98 0.86 0.89 
Group 54 0.98 0.89 0.91 
Group 55 0.97 0.86 0.90 
 
 
Note: The figures relate to 2,932 schools that are not (explicitly) selective in their intakes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Rank correlations of schools by group based on Measure 1 absolute raw VA 
score (selective schools excluded) 
 
 
 Group 22 Group 33 Group 44 Group 55 
Group 22 1.00    
Group 33 0.68 1.00   
Group 44 0.58 0.71 1.00  
Group 55 0.37 0.49 0.71 1.00 
Average  0.70 0.82 0.94 0.74 
 
Note: The figures relate to 2,932 schools that are not (explicitly) selective in their intakes.  
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Figure 1: The proportion of schools that are differentially effective by decile of school 
mean KS2 score, Measure 6 (5% significance level) 
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Note: sample of 3,096 schools including selective schools.
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Figure 2: The proportion of schools that are differentially effective by school mean KS4 
GCSE score, Measure 6 (5% significance level) 
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Note: sample of 3,096 schools including selective schools.
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Figure 3: The proportion of schools that are differentially effective by school mean CVA 
score, Measure 6 (5% significance level) 
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Note: sample of 3,096 schools including selective schools. 
28 
 
 
28 
 
Figure 4: Mean value added (in standard deviations) by group for differentially 
effective schools compared to non differentially effective schools, Measure 6 (5% 
significance level) 
 
 
 
 
Note: sample of 3,096 schools including selective schools. A school is differentially effective 
if its group means for Measure 6 are significantly different at the 5% level. The graph shows 
the mean across schools in each group (weighted by the number of pupils in the school in the 
group concerned) of the school average value-added on Measure 6. 
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Appendix: Correlations in schools’ rankings on effectiveness measures for different 
prior attainment groups: the impact of sampling error
18
 
 
Table 8 shows the strength of the association between a ranking of schools by their 
average effectiveness for one prior attainment group, e.g. the low ability group 2-2, with that 
for another group, e.g. the high ability group 5-5. However, the number of observations used 
to compute the average effectiveness for any ability group within a particular school is often 
not that large. For example, in the case of the single school we considered in Table 3, there 
are less than 50 students in each of three of the different ability groups. Hence although the 
data we use to compute our effectiveness measures refer to the population of all children in 
secondary schools in two years, it is useful to think of the observations for each ability group 
for each school in the data as representing a sample: a sample drawn from a „super-
population‟ of all possible students that could attend each school. That is, sitting behind the 
means for each group that we observe in the data for each school is a set of means for the 
super-population in each group in the school. Viewed in this way, the correlations presented 
in Table 8 are estimates of (super-) population parameters that are subject to sampling error. 
Imagine that the „true‟ correlation of schools‟ mean scores for a particular measure 
(M1 to M6) for, say, groups 2-2 and 5-5 were 1.0. In other words, if our calculations of the 
means were based on the full super-population of students in each group in each school, then 
the schools would be ranked in exactly the same way for each of the two ability groups. 
However, the correlation would not be perfect in the actual data available for analysis 
because of the „noise‟ resulting from sampling variation – in each school we only have a 
sample from the group super-population. We want to assess how important this sampling 
variation is likely to be with the size of the samples that we have and hence how likely it is 
that low values of correlations in our actual data shown in Table 8 are just the result of 
sampling variation. 
How might we estimate the extent of the sampling error? One possibility would be to 
bootstrap our estimates. We adopt a different approach, simulating the sampling distribution 
for the correlations under assumptions about the super-population values. 
 
                                                 
18
 We are very grateful to James Brown, University of Southampton, for suggesting the approach taken in this 
Appendix. He carried out the simulations and has co-authored our write-up of them here. 
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Procedure 
 
Our procedure is to simulate the sampling distribution under the assumption that the 
sample standard deviation of scores within a group for a given school is a good estimate of 
the super-population standard deviation of scores for that group within the school. For the 
purpose of this exercise, we focus on the Pearson correlation rather than the Spearman‟s rank 
correlation. 
Consider the 2,372 schools that have students in both the 2-2 and 5-5 groups. 
 
1. School 1 has, say, 30 students in group 2-2 and 40 students in group 5-5, standard 
deviations in our data for the measure with which we are concerned (M1 to M6) equal to 
SD221 and SD551. 
 
2. Draw a random sample of size 30 students from a normally distributed infinite population 
with a mean=XA1 and standard deviation=SD221. Record the sample mean=x221 
 
3. Draw a random sample of size 40 students from a normally distributed infinite population 
with a mean=XB1 and standard deviation=SD551. Record the sample mean=x551 
 
4. Go to School 2. School 2 has, say, 50 students in group 2-2 and 65 students in group 5-5, 
with standard deviations in our data equal to SD222 and SD552. 
 
5. Draw a random sample of size 50 students from a normally distributed infinite population 
with a mean=XA2 and standard deviation=SD222. Record the sample mean=x222 
 
6. Draw a random sample of size 65 students from a normally distributed infinite population 
with a mean=XB2 and standard deviation=SD552. Record the sample mean=x552 
 
7. Continue process for each of the 2,372 schools. 
 
8. Now compute the correlation coefficient of the two sets of sample means [x221, x222, 
x223...x222372] and [x551, x552, x553...x552372]. 
 
9. Perform steps 1 to 8 1,000 times, giving 1,000 estimates of the correlation coefficient. 
 
10. Inspect the distribution of these 1,000 correlation coefficients. Compare with the one 
correlation we have calculated with our actual data. 
 
In performing this simulation, there are two parameters that can be varied. The first is the 
correlation of principal interest, that is the correlation in the super-population between 
schools‟ means scores on the measure concerned (M1 to M6) for group 2-2 and their scores 
for group 5-5. We call these the „between-school‟ correlations (Table 8 provides estimates of 
these from our actual data). The second is the correlation within a school between the mean 
scores for its group 2-2 students and its group 5-5 students. We call these the „within-school‟ 
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correlations and draw samples to control the correlation, i.e. to achieve an assumed value. 
(The assumption made here determines the relationship between XA1 and XB1 and between 
XA2 and XB2 at Steps 2 and 3 and Steps 5 and 6 in the simulation.) We can assume that this 
correlation is zero, which is the simplest case, or we can allow for a positive correlation 
reflecting the idea that if a school has a „good draw‟ of 2-2 students in terms of the sample 
mean score on the measure concerned, it is more likely also to have a good draw of 5-5 
students on account of some influence common to both groups that raises scores e.g. good 
teachers or a particularly good cohort. Arguably, the closer the prior ability groups, e.g. 3-3 
and 3-4, the higher this within-school correlation will be. 
 
Results 
 
Figure A1 investigates the sensitivity of the results of the simulation to the choice of 
the within-school correlation. We fix the super-population value of the between-school 
correlation for groups 2-2 and 5-5 at the value actually observed in our sample data, 0.33. 
(Note we are considering Pearson correlations in this Appendix rather than the Spearman 
rank correlations considered in Table 8 – the rank correlation for group 2-2 and 5-5 is 0.37.) 
Each vertical bar shows the range that includes 95% of the 1000 sample estimates of the 
between-school correlation that were produced in the simulation. We vary the within-school 
correlation across the range from zero to one. As the within-school correlation rises, the range 
of the estimates of the between-school correlation moves up since the sample „draws‟ for the 
two groups in each school increase in similarity in the sense described above. The results 
show that actual observed sample value of the between-group correlation – shown by the 
horizontal line – can be seen as consistent with a super-population between-group correlation 
of the same value, 0.33, and a within-school correlation of 0.3 to 0.5 but at the 5% 
significance level we would reject the hypothesis that within-school correlation was 0.2 or 
less of 0.6 or more. 
We next repeat the exercise considering only schools with at least 30 pupils in both 
groups, 2-2 and 5-5, so as to strengthen the validity of the use of the central limit theorem in 
the simulation. This reduces the number of schools included in the simulation to only 554. 
The observed sample between-school correlation increases to 0.42. Restricted to the larger 
schools in this way, we find the same pattern as before, albeit around the higher observed 
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correlation, with more variation in the distributions as each correlation is based on a reduced 
number of schools. 
We now return to the full data set of 2,372 schools and present sampling distributions 
in which we vary the super-population (i.e. the „true‟) between-school correlation from 0.1 up 
to 1.0. We do this under three different assumptions about the within-school correlation, 
setting this to zero, 0.4 and 0.7, leading to Figures A2-A4. In each case the horizontal line 
shows the value of the between-group correlation that is observed in our actual sample data. 
Note that as the assumed „true‟ between-school correlation approaches 1.0, we have to obtain 
a distribution that lies wholly below the „true‟ value as a correlation coefficient cannot exceed 
this level. 
An obvious feature of these graphs – and the key result for our purposes – is that the 
horizontal line showing the sample value of the between-school correlation intersects with 
very few of the vertical bars indicating the range for 95% of the values in each simulation. In 
other words, in most cases our observed sample value is not consistent (at the 5% 
significance level) with the between-school value assumed in the different simulations. For 
example, Figure A3 suggests that the observed sample value of 0.33 is consistent with the 
„true‟ value being 0.3 (and the within-school correlation being 0.4) but is not consistent with 
values of 0.1-0.2 or values of 0.4 or more. Hence we can conclude with a reasonable degree 
of confidence that the relatively low observed sample value is not simply the result of 
sampling error pushing the sample value well below a much higher „true‟ value in the super-
population.  In fact we can reject the hypothesis that the true value is 0.5 or more irrespective 
of whether the within-correlation is assumed to be zero (Figure A2), to be moderate, 0.4 
(Figure A3), or whether it is assumed to be quite high, 0.7 (Figure A4). 
This is an encouraging result – it suggests that our results in Table 8 are not just 
driven by „noise‟ resulting from relatively modest numbers of students in each ability group 
in each school. However, we should note that we have considered only the most extreme 
comparison, the low ability group 2-2 and the high ability group 5-5, and a more complete 
analysis would also consider the sampling distributions for groups that are closer in average 
ability. (For example, consider groups 3-3 and 4-4, where Table 8 shows the means to have a 
between-school correlation of 0.71 in our data. Imagine that the within-school correlation was 
high, e.g. 0.7, which seems reasonable for groups of similar ability.  Were our simulations in 
this case to result in a diagram like Figure A4, we would not be able to reject the null 
hypothesis of a „true‟ between school correlation of 0.9 or even 1.0.) 
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Figure A1: Varying the within-school correlation, between-school correlation = 0.33 
(groups 2-2 and 5-5) 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
34 
 
Figure A2: Varying the between-school correlation, within-school correlation = 0 
(groups 2-2 and 5-5) 
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Figure A3: Varying the between-school correlation, within-school correlation = 0.4 
(groups 2-2 and 5-5) 
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Figure A4: Varying the between-school correlation, within-school correlation = 0.7 
(groups 2-2 and 5-5) 
 
 
 
 
 
